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Abstract
A convex two-stage non-cooperative multi-agent game under uncertainty is formulated
as a two-stage stochastic variational inequality (SVI). Under standard assumptions, we
provide sufficient conditions for the existence of solutions of the two-stage SVI and pro-
pose a regularized sample average approximation method for solving it. We prove the
convergence of the method as the regularization parameter tends to zero and the sample
size tends to infinity. Moreover, our approach is applied to a two-stage stochastic pro-
duction and supply planning problem with homogeneous commodity in an oligopolistic
market. Numerical results based on historical data in crude oil market are presented to
demonstrate the effectiveness of the two-stage SVI in describing the market share of oil
producing agents.
Mathematics subject classification: 90C15, 90C33
Key words: Two-stage stochastic variational inequalities, Cournot-Nash equilibrium, Reg-
ularized method, Progressive hedging method, Uncertainty, Oil market share
1. Introduction
We consider a two-stage non-cooperative multi-agent game under uncertainty. The model
is used to describe a homogenous commodity production and supply planning problem in an
oligopolistic market. In particular, we focus on a J-player stochastic Nash equilibrium problem
(SNEP) of Cournot competition, whose solution concept is characterized by stochastic Cournot-
Nash (CN) equilibria. Conventional non-cooperative game theory has a long history being an
effective model to describe market behaviour, yet mostly under deterministic settings. In order
to explore characteristics of real markets, one cannot neglect the presence of uncertainty.
Researchers have studied various real markets through SNEPs in recent years. Jofre´, Rock-
afellar and Wets [24] investigated various economic equilibria using SVIs. A scenario-based
multi-stage oligopolistic market equilibrium problem under uncertainty was discussed in [16].
A two-settlement oligopolistic equilibrium with uncertainty in the future market was presented
in [48]. For practical applications, electricity markets with hydro-electric distribution have been
studied by Philpott, Ferris and Wets [30] in which the levels of water reserves were modelled
under uncertainty. The contemporary treatment of classical equilibrium problems are investi-
gated through finite-dimensional variational inequalities (VIs) and complementarity problems
(CPs) with a wide range of applications under the assumption of deterministic and single-stage
decision, see [14, 20] and references therein. Yet, many practical applications are formulated
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under uncertainty [9, 10, 21, 28, 29, 47], and the corresponding multi-stage SVIs and CPs were
studied extensively over the last two decades. In [5], Chen and Fukushima considered the
stochastic linear CP (LCP) by expected residual minimization (ERM) procedure. The quasi-
Monte Carlo method was adopted to generate scenarios of observation and thus to obtain the
discrete approximation problem. Chen, Wets and Zhang [10] investigated SVI problems by
the ERM procedure, and the sample average approximation (SAA) method was employed to
approximate the expected smoothing residual function. More recently, as an extension from
single-stage to multi-stage decision processes, Rockafellar and Wets [40] put forward multi-stage
SVI problems, which laid a solid foundation for further research. In [6], Chen, Pang and Wets
introduced the ERM procedure for two-stage SVI problems and the Douglas-Rachford splitting
method was used to present numerical results. Chen, Sun and Xu [9] considered a two-stage
stochastic LCP. Structural properties of the problem were studied under the assumption of
strong monotonicity, and a discrete scheme was conducted by partition of the support set and
the corresponding convergence assertion was established. More generally, Chen, Shapiro and
Sun [8] investigated the SAA of two-stage stochastic nonlinear generalized equations, which in-
cluded two-stage nonlinear SVI problems as special cases. Exponential rate of convergence was
derived by using the technique of perturbed partial linearization. From the perspective of the
numerical calculation, the equilibrium problems are usually rewritten as a minimization prob-
lem, mostly nonsmooth. For this class of problems, the smoothing techniques (see [3]) can be
employed so that differentiable methods, e.g., Newton’s method, become applicable in solving
the smoothing problem, see for instance [4, 11–13]. For numerical implementation, Rockafellar
and Sun extended the well-known progressive hedging method (PHM) for multi-stage stochastic
programming problems to multi-stage SVIs in [33].
The decision vectors of production and supply plan problems, so-called strategies, are dis-
tinguished into two categories: (i) those of “here-and-now” type, which do not depend on
outcomes of random events in the future, and (ii) those treated as responses. The goal of this
paper is to establish a model that describes the market mechanism for Cournot competition
under uncertainties. The solution concepts of the model assemble the real strategies adopted
by participants of the market. We will provide methodology to solve the proposed model and
demonstrating its numerical implementation.
We summarize the main contributions of this paper as follows.
• A two-stage stochastic Nash equilibrium problem is proposed to model production and
supply competition of a homogenous product under uncertainty in an oligopolistic market.
• The model is recast as two-stage SVIs whose solutions characterize a CN equilibrium.
• A regularized sample average approximation method is proposed to solve the two-stage
SVIs with convergence properties under mild assumptions.
• The model is tested numerically for its effectiveness. Moreover, it is used to describe the
market share observation in the world market of crude oil. We show that our model is
not only able to reproduce historical in-sample market share but also capable of making
out-of-sample predictions based on real data sets.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the two-stage SNEPs are
developed and recast into two-stage SVIs. Section 3 contains structural analysis of two-stage
SVIs and the corresponding regularized problems. The convergence theorems of the proposed
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regularized SAA method are presented in section 4. Numerical results based on randomly
generated data and simulation on real market data of crude oil are presented and analyzed in
section 6. We conclude our study in the final section.
2. Two-stage stochastic Cournot-Nash game
All stochastic models involve inherently “ordered” components over decision horizons. In
particular, the decisions in a strategy may respond to the information that is available only at
the present stage, which is known as nonanticipativity. In this paper, we consider a two-stage
stochastic CN equilibrium problem, which extends the classical deterministic CN equilibrium
problem in [27]. Let ξ : Ω → Rd be a random variable with support set Ξ ⊆ Rd, and let
(Ξ,F , P ) denote the induced probability space. A strategy pair of agent j ∈ J := {1, ..., J} is
denoted as
(xj ∈ R, yj : Ξ→ R,F-measurable), (2.1)
where xj is a first-stage decision vector and yj ∈ Y represents a second-stage response function
with Y being the space of F-measurable functions defined on Ξ. Let Ln be the Lebesgue space
of Rn-valued functions with L∞n denotes the class of measurable essentially bounded functions.
Following a similar treatment as in [6], we further require the second-stage response function
of random variable to be essentially bounded, i.e., yj ∈ L∞1 . Collectively, the vector of strategy
pairs of all agents can be written as
(x ∈ RJ , y : Ξ→ RJ ,F-measurable). (2.2)
A strategy pair
(
x∗j , y
∗
j
) ∈ R × L∞1 is said to be an equilibrium of our stochastic model if it
solves the following problem for all agents j ∈ J .
maximize(xj ,yj(·)) W
1
j (xj , x
∗
−j) + E
[
W 2j
(
ξ, yj(ξ), y
∗
−j(ξ)
)]
, (objective function)
subject to xj ∈ Xj , (first-stage constraints)
yj(ξ) ∈a.s. Yj , gj
(
ξ, xj , yj(ξ)
) ≤a.s. 0 (second-stage constraints)
(2.3)
where
x∗−j = (x
∗
1, . . . , x
∗
j−1, x
∗
j+1, . . . , x
∗
J),
y∗−j(ξ) = (y
∗
1(ξ), . . . , y
∗
j−1(ξ), y
∗
j+1(ξ), . . . , y
∗
J(ξ)),
and yj(ξ) denotes the value of response yj to realization ξ
1) , with
• W 1j : R × RJ−1 → R a first-stage wealth function of agent j, concave and continuously
differentiable with respect to xj .
• W 2j : Ξ×R×RJ−1 → R a second-stage wealth function of agent j, concave, well-defined
and finite.
• Xj , Yj nonempty, closed and convex subsets of R and the second-stage constraints hold
almost surely (a.s.).
• gj : Ξ × R × R → R a continuously differentiable function with respect to
(
xj , yj(ξ)
)
for
almost every (a.e.) ξ ∈ Ξ and F-measurable.
1) For ease the exposition, the same notation ξ is used for both a random variable and its realization in Rd
without causing confusion on the context.
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In this paper, the model (2.3) is formulated under the assumption that the uncertainty can be
described by a random variable ξ with known distribution. From the perspective of the entire
system, the market2) “chooses” x ∈ RJ before a realization ξ ∈ Ξ is revealed and later “selects”
y(ξ) ∈ RJ with known realization.
2.1. Two-stage stochastic commodity production and supply planning
The application of commodity production and supply in an oligopolistic market serves as
a motivation as well as the practical problem of interest. Presented as a stochastic game,
the strategy of each agent in supply-side of the market can be described as the solution of a
stochastic optimization problem (2.3). The decision process follows that agent j ∈ J decides
an optimal production quantity xj of the commodity at the production stage. At the second-
stage, each agent decides a supply quantity yj(ξ) after ξ is observed, and a total quantity
T (y(ξ)) :=
∑J
j=1 yj(ξ) is supplied to the market. Our focus on oligopolistic markets requires
that the price is dominantly affected by the total supplied quantity in the market T (y(ξ)).
Therefore, all the trading occurs at the price p : Ξ × R → R+, determined by a stochastic
inverse demand curve p(ξ, T (y(ξ)). In practice, production and supply quantities are subject to
physical restrictions, e.g., capability of production plant, logistic restriction, etc., i.e., xj ∈ Xj
and yj(ξ) ∈a.s. Yj . More specifically, we have non-negative requirements for both production
and supply, Xj = R+ and Yj = R+. The relations between stage-wise decision variables xj
and yj(ξ) are captured by constraints gj
(
ξ, xj , yj(ξ)
) ≤a.s. 0 in (2.3). Essentially, every agent
needs to formulate and solve a two-stage stochastic programming problem with recourse in the
sense of achieving equilibria of a J-agents non-cooperative game of the market. We further
require that agent j’s supply to the market cannot exceed his/her production quantity, i.e.,
yj(ξ) − xj ≤a.s. 0. This can be interpreted as the fact that agents may have no stock to start
with, or they need to preserve certain reserved quantities prior to each decision process.
The problem can then be viewed from a slight different perspective than that of problem
(2.3). As seen from the first-stage, agent j ∈ J wants to find a production quantity xj ≥ 0 to
maximize W 1j (xj , x
∗
−j) + E
[
Φj(xj , x
∗
−j , ξ)
]
, (2.4)
where,
Φj(xj , x
∗
−j , ξ) = sup
yj(ξ)≥0
{W 2j (ξ, yj(ξ), y∗−j(ξ)) | xj ≥ yj(ξ), for a.e. ξ ∈ Ξ}. (2.5)
Objective function in (2.4) is regarded as the expected profit of agent j’s and problems (2.4)-
(2.5) are termed intrinsic first-stage problem following that of a related treatment in [35]. In
particular, the analysis of intrinsic first-stage problem and the stochastic programming prob-
lem with recourse in convex case were carried out in a series of studies by Rockafellar and
Wets [34–37] and more recently in [40]. The key feature of intrinsic first-stage problem, as
well as formulation (2.3), is the requirement on precise orders of decision execution, commonly
known as the constraints of nonanticipativity, which implies the decision variable in each stage
should only depend on the information (data) available up to that stage. In (2.4)-(2.5), the
second-stage decisions are explicitly determined after the first-stage decision, provided for each
xj the second-stage problem is well-defined [43]. However, the study of optimality condition
2) A “social planner” is commonly termed in literature of economics, and can be interpreted as one individual
who oversees the system and assigns strategy to each agents.
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of (2.4)-(2.5), in the case of a general probability space (Ξ,F , P )1) , is very complicated since
one needs to characterize the order of the decision process explicitly. For ease of analysis, we
assume that there exists a multiplier λj ∈ L11 corresponds to second-stage constraint and study
the saddle-point condition of the Lagrangian formulation of problem (2.3). It is worth men-
tioning that the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) condition of problem (2.3) (see [34]) introduces a
second-stage multiplier λ˜j ∈ (L∞1 )∗ for every j ∈ J which incorporates the two-stage decision
making process. This can be seen from the fact that any element of the dual space (L∞1 )
∗ can
be decomposed into a component of L11 and a “singular” component, corresponding to the mul-
tiplier of nonanticipativity. The saddle-point condition is shown to be sufficient and “almost”
necessary for optimality of problem (2.3), and we refer the interested readers to [34–37,40] for
more details.
The Lagrangian formulation of problem (2.3) associated with agent j is of the following
form
Lj(xj , x
∗
−j , yj , y
∗
−j , λj) = L
1
j (xj , x
∗
−j) + E
[
L2j
(
ξ, xj , yj(ξ), y
∗
−j(ξ), λj(ξ)
)]
,
where
L1j (xj , x
∗
−j) = W
1
j (xj , x
∗
−j),
L2j
(
ξ, xj , yj(ξ), y
∗
−j(ξ), λj(ξ)
)
= W 2j (ξ, yj(ξ), y
∗
−j(ξ)) + λj(ξ)(xj − yj(ξ)).
The constraints yj(ξ) ≤a.s. xj can be interpreted as the situation under which the profit maxi-
mizing supply y∗j (ξ) of agent j is not necessarily equal to the total production quantity xj . This
feature of our model differs from conventional requirement on production-clearing condition,
i.e., all the produced goods are expected to supply to the market.
In order to make further progress in characterizing the CN equilibrium, we need to specify
the structures of our wealth functions, W 1j and W
2
j , suitable for our application. We assume
that the production cost for j-th agent is quadratic, i.e., for each j ∈ J the cost of producing
xj amount of production is
1
2cjx
2
j + ajxj , for some cj > 0, aj > 0. In the second-stage, the cost
function of the supply or second-stage is assumed to be linear and of stochastic nature, i.e., for
each j ∈ J the cost of supplying yj(ξ) amount of commodity is hj(ξ)yj(ξ) for a.e. ξ ∈ Ξ. Here,
hj(ξ) can be regarded as the unite supply cost of agent j. We adopt a classic stochastic inverse
demand curve, see for example [23], that takes the expression p
(
ξ, T (y(ξ))
)
= p0(ξ)−γ(ξ)T (y(ξ))
for the spot price. In practice, the stochastic benchmark price excluding the effect of supply to
the market p0 : Ξ 7→ R+ can be estimated via statistical approaches based on real data. The
supply discount γ : Ξ → R+ acts as a market mechanism to adjust and reflect uncertainty in
quantity in the market. In order to respect the market mechanism of supply-demand relation,
we make the following assumption through out our study.
Assumption 2.1. There exists a γ0 > 0 such that γ(ξ) ≥ γ0 for a.e. ξ ∈ Ξ.
Thus, agent j’s stage-wise wealth functions are,
W 1j (xj , x
∗
−j) = −
1
2
cjx
2
j − ajxj ,
and
W 2j (ξ, yj(ξ), y−j(ξ)) =
(
pj(ξ)− γ(ξ)T (y(ξ))
)
yj(ξ),
1) In cases of finitely supported distribution, the equivalence between intrinsic first-stage problem and the
original recourse problem can be established, and the optimality condition of the recourse problem can be
applied, see for example [40].
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where the short-handed notation of the risk-adjusted spot price of agent j’s is denoted by
pj(ξ) := p0(ξ)− hj(ξ).
We are now ready to consider the specific stochastic programming for every agent j ∈ J :
maximizexj E[Φj(ξ, x)]−
1
2
cjx
2
j − ajxj
subject to 0 ≤ xj ,
(2.6)
where
Φj(ξ, x) = maximizeyj(ξ)
(
pj(ξ)− γ(ξ)
( J∑
i 6=j
y∗i (ξ) + yj(ξ)
))
yj(ξ)
subject to 0 ≤ yj(ξ) ≤ xj , for a.e. ξ ∈ Ξ.
(2.7)
Note that the requirements in problem (2.7) hold a.s. in accordance with the a.s. constraints of
the second-stage in problem (2.3). However, (2.6)-(2.7) is not easy to solve, especially in a SNEP
with J ≥ 2, see [8]. The complication arises since the j-th agent’s problem contains that of the
other agents’ strategy, not yet known at the decision horizon. A commonly used method is to
recast problem (2.6)-(2.7) of each agent as a stochastic equilibrium problem. Then, obtaining
an equilibrium of the convex J-player game (2.6)-(2.7) is equivalent to finding its solution for all
agents. Stochastic equilibrium has been shown to be an effective method to study and to solve
two-stage multi-players stochastic game problems, see for instance [9, 28, 33, 40, 46]. We study
the saddle-point condition of the problem (2.6)-(2.7), rewritten in the form of problem (2.3).
More specifically, for all j ∈ J , there exists λ¯j(ξ) ∈ L11 with λ¯(ξ) ≥a.s. 0 so that a strategy(
x¯j , y¯j
) ∈ R+ × L∞+ solves the following system.
− cj x¯j − aj + E
[
λ¯j(ξ)
] ∈ N[0,∞)(x¯j),
pj(ξ)− γ(ξ)
J∑
i 6=j
y¯i(ξ)− 2γ(ξ)y¯j(ξ)− λ¯j(ξ) ∈a.s. N[0,∞)(y¯j(ξ)), (stationality)
x¯j ≥ 0, y¯j(ξ) ≥a.s. 0, x¯j − y¯j(ξ) ≥a.s. 0, (feasibility)
λ¯j(ξ) ≥a.s. 0, (dual feasibilty)
λ¯j(ξ)⊥a.s.(x¯j − y¯j(ξ)). (complementarity)
In particular, stationarity comes from the first-order necessary optimality condition under the
assertion ∂E
[
Φj(ξ, x)
] ⊆ E[∂xΦ(ξ, x)]. The assertion is discussed in [2], and the above system
can be viewed as a weaker condition for optimality.
Rewritten in a compact form as SVI, the optimal strategy-multiplier pair (xj , yj , λj) ∈
R+ × L∞+ × L1+ must satisfy,
0 ≤ xj ⊥ cjxj + aj − E
[
λj(ξ)
] ≥ 0,
0 ≤a.s. yj(ξ) ⊥a.s. − pj(ξ) + γ(ξ)
J∑
i6=j
yi(ξ) + 2γ(ξ)yj(ξ) + λj(ξ) ≥a.s. 0,
0 ≤a.s. λj(ξ) ⊥a.s. xj − yj(ξ) ≥a.s. 0.
(2.8)
It follows that since all agents in oligopolistic market act non-cooperatively, we write
down the equilibrium interpreted as that of the whole system. More specifically, let x =
(x1, . . . , xJ)
T be the first-stage decision vectors of the system, and for a.e. ξ ∈ Ξ, the second-
stage decision vector y(ξ) =
(
y1(ξ), . . . , yJ(ξ)
)T
and its corresponding multiplier vector λ(ξ) =
Two-stage stochastic variational inequalities for Nash equilibrium 7(
λ1(ξ), . . . , λJ(ξ)
)T
are denoted respectively. Similarly, parameter vectors can be written col-
lectively as a = (a1, . . . , aJ)
T , p(ξ) = (p1(ξ), . . . , pJ(ξ))
T . Then, we can treat the SVI for all
agents as a two-stage stochastic complementary problem (SCP):
0 ≤ x ⊥ Cx− E[λ(ξ)] + a ≥ 0,
0 ≤
(
y(ξ)
λ(ξ)
)
⊥
(
Π(ξ) I
−I 0
)(
y(ξ)
λ(ξ)
)
+
(−p(ξ)
x
)
≥ 0, for a.e. ξ ∈ Ξ, (2.9)
where
C = diag(c1, c2, ..., cJ), Π(ξ) = γ(ξ)(ee
T + I).
It follows that for the whole system, a J-tuple of strategies(
x∗, y∗, λ∗
)
=
(
(x∗1, y
∗
1 , λ
∗
1), . . . , (x
∗
J , y
∗
J , λ
∗
J)
) ∈ RJ × L∞J × L1J
is called a solution of the two-stage SCP (2.9).
3. Structure of the regularized two-stage SCP
In this section, we focus on characterizing solutions of two-stage stochastic linear comple-
mentarity problem (2.9). From the derivation of first-order necessary optimality conditions of
problem (2.6)-(2.7) and the monotonicity of problem (2.9), we have the following results on
existence of solutions.
Proposition 3.1 (Theorem 2, [41]) For any fixed pair (x, ξ) ∈ RJ+ × Ξ, the second-stage
problem (2.7) has a unique solution.
Thus, for the two-stage stochastic linear complementarity problem (2.9), the following propo-
sition holds.
Proposition 3.2. The two-stage stochastic linear complementarity problem (2.9) has relatively
complete recourse, i.e., for any x ∈ RJ+ and a.e. ξ ∈ Ξ the second-stage problem of (2.9) is
solvable.
Proof. The coefficient matrix of the second-stage part of (2.9)
M(ξ) =
(
Π(ξ) I
−I 0
)
is positive semidefinite for a.e. ξ ∈ Ξ.
For any given x ∈ RJ+, it follows that there always exists a pair
(
yˆ(ξ), λˆ(ξ)
) ∈ RJ ×RJ , such
that (
yˆ(ξ)
λˆ(ξ)
)
≥ 0,
(
Π(ξ) I
−I 0
)(
yˆ(ξ)
λˆ(x)
)
+
(−p(ξ)
x
)
≥ 0, for a.e. ξ ∈ Ξ.
In detail, we consider a special choice yˆ(ξ) = 0 and λˆ(ξ) = max{0, p(ξ)}, where the max
function is taken componentwise. Thus, the corresponding quadratic programming problem
of the linear complementarity problem is feasible. It follows from [32, Lemma 3.1.1, Theorem
3.1.2] that there must exist at least a solution which solves the second-stage problem for any
given pair (x, ξ). 
Although the second-stage problem (2.7) has a unique equilibrium for any given (x, ξ) (see
Proposition 3.1), the system (2.9) may admit multiple solutions. To see this, we give an
illustrative example.
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Example 3.1. Consider a duopoly game, with given x = (x1, x2)
T ≥ 0, and −p(ξ) ≥a.s. 0.
Then, the corresponding second-stage part of complementarity system (2.9) reads
0 ≤

y1(ξ)
y2(ξ)
λ1(ξ)
λ2(ξ)
⊥

2γ(ξ) γ(ξ) 1 0
γ(ξ) 2γ(ξ) 0 1
−1 0 0 0
0 −1 0 0


y1(ξ)
y2(ξ)
λ1(ξ)
λ2(ξ)
+

−p1(ξ)
−p2(ξ)
x1
x2
 ≥ 0, for a.e. ξ ∈ Ξ. (3.1)
Then, the solution set of (3.1) is of the following form{
(0, 0, λ˜1(ξ), λ˜2(ξ)) : λ˜1(ξ) =
{
0, x1 > 0
λ1(ξ), x1 = 0
, λ˜2(ξ) =
{
0, x2 > 0
λ2(ξ), x2 = 0
, for a.e. ξ ∈ Ξ
}
,
where λ1(ξ) ≥a.e. 0, λ2(ξ) ≥a.e. 0.
In Example 3.1, the “equilibrium price” λ may admit multiple values when there exist some
zero-valued components of x.
Technically, the multiple solutions of the second-stage problem will cause trouble when
we handle the two-stage stochastic complementarity system (2.9), both in computation and
analysis [43]. The assumption ensuring the uniqueness of second-stage solution is usually made,
see for instance [8, 9]. Moreover, interpreted as “equilibrium price” associated with agents’
production clearing, different values of λ would have ambiguous economical interpretations.
Motivated by these, we propose a regularized method to seek for one particular choice of
“equilibrium price”. Similar approach can be found in for example [7].
For an  > 0, let
M (ξ) =
(
Π(ξ) I
−I I
)
and q(x, ξ) =
(−p(ξ)
x
)
.
Thus, we propose the regularized SCP of (2.9) as follows:
0 ≤ x ⊥ Cx− E[λ(ξ)] + a ≥ 0,
0 ≤
(
y(ξ)
λ(ξ)
)
⊥
(
Π(ξ) I
−I I
)(
y(ξ)
λ(ξ)
)
+
(−p(ξ)
x
)
≥ 0, for a.e. ξ ∈ Ξ. (3.2)
For a given pair (x, ξ) ∈ RJ+ × Ξ, the second-stage problem of (2.9) and the regularized
second-stage problem (3.2) are denoted by LCP(q(x, ξ),M(ξ)) and LCP(q(x, ξ),M (ξ)) respec-
tively. Their solution functions are chosen from the respective solution sets and expressed by
z(q(x, ξ)) and z(q(x, ξ)). In the sequel, we omit the ξ and x without causing confusion, i.e.,
LCP(q,M) := LCP(q(x, ξ),M(ξ)) and LCP(q,M ) := LCP(q(x, ξ),M (ξ)).
For clearer demonstration, recall our illustrative Example 3.1, and consider its regularization
approach. Thus, the second-stage of the regularized problem takes the following form
0 ≤

y1(ξ)
y2(ξ)
λ1(ξ)
λ2(ξ)
⊥

2γ(ξ) γ(ξ) 1 0
γ(ξ) 2γ(ξ) 0 1
−1 0  0
0 −1 0 


y1(ξ)
y2(ξ)
λ1(ξ)
λ2(ξ)
+

−p1(ξ)
−p2(ξ)
x1
x2
 ≥ 0, for a.e. ξ ∈ Ξ. (3.3)
Under the same condition as in Example 3.1, we can obtain the unique solution of (3.3), which
y˜1, y˜2, λ˜1, λ˜2 equal to 0 for a.e. ξ ∈ Ξ. Due to the positive definiteness of C, it follows that we
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obtain the unique solution of the first-stage problem is x1 = 0, x2 = 0. Then, we have obtained
one particular solution of the original problem, the trivial solution in this example. The key
feature of our regularized method is that it promises the existence and uniqueness of solution
due to the strongly monotone of regularized two-stage problem.
In the remaining of this section, we concern ourselves with the solution z of LCP(q,M )
and explore the structure of the second-stage solution.
Proposition 3.3. For any fixed  > 0, the regularized problem (3.2) has a unique solution
(x, y, λ) ∈ RJ × Y × Y.
Proof. The result can be obtained via a similar procedure as in [9, Proposition 2.1 (i)] and
we only need to show that the condition in [9, Assumption 1] holds. Recall that Assumption
2.1 holds, then for a.e. ξ ∈ Ξ xu(ξ)
v(ξ)
T C 0 −I0 Π(ξ) I
I −I I
 xu(ξ)
v(ξ)
 ≥ τ(‖x‖2 + ‖u(ξ)‖2 + ‖v(ξ)‖2),
where τ = min{c¯, γ0(J + 1), } with c¯ denoting the minimum diagonal element of C. 
Theorem 3.1. For any fixed  > 0, x ≥ 0 and a.e. ξ ∈ Ξ, the j-th component of the second-
stage solution of problem (3.2)
(
(y)j , (λ
)j
)
is either (0, 0), or one of the following two forms:
−
(
γ(ξ)T  − pj(ξ)
γ(ξ)
, 0
)
,
−
(
(γ(ξ)T  − pj(ξ))− xj
γ(ξ) + 1
,
γ(ξ)(T  + xj)− pj(ξ)
γ(ξ) + 1
) (3.4)
for j ∈ J , where
T  :=
J∑
i=1
(y)i =
γ(ξ)
∑
i∈I3 xi + γ(ξ)
∑
i∈I2∪I3 pi(ξ) +
∑
i∈I2 pi(ξ)(
γ(ξ)(|I2|+ |I3|+ 1) + |I2|+ 1
)
γ(ξ)
(3.5)
with
I2 = {j ∈ J : γ(ξ)T  + (λ)j − pj(ξ) < 0, (y)j − xj ≤ 0} ,
I3 = {j ∈ J : γ(ξ)T  + (λ)j − pj(ξ) < 0, (y)j − xj > 0} ,
where |I2| and |I3| denote the cardinality of I2 and I3 respectively.
The detailed proof of the Theorem 3.1 is given in Appendix. Note that the above theorem
gives the forms of the unique solution of the second-stage regularized problem (3.2). However,
it may be used to assist numerical calculation since the partition of the index set is not known
in advance. Nevertheless, it is suffice for our purposes of deriving additional properties of the
solutions. Due to the positive definiteness of M  and special structure of problem (3.2), we first
obtain the following Lipschitz continuous property, following [11, Corollary 2.1].
Lemma 3.1. For any ξ ∈ Ξ, there exists L(ξ) > 0 such that for any fixed  ∈ (0, 1], we have
‖z(q(x1, ξ))− z(q(x2, ξ))‖ ≤ L(ξ)‖x1 − x2‖, for x1, x2 ∈ RJ+.
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Lemma 3.2. For any fixed  > 0 and (x, ξ) ∈ RJ+ × Ξ, T  has the following upper bound:
T  ≤ ‖x‖1 +
(
+
1
γ(ξ)
)
‖p(ξ)‖1 .
Proof. We have the following derivation from (3.5) that
T  =
γ(ξ)
∑
i∈I3 xi + γ(ξ)
∑
i∈I2∪I3 pi(ξ) +
∑
i∈I2 pi(ξ)
(γ(ξ)(|I2|+ |I3|+ 1) + |I2|+ 1) γ(ξ)
≤γ(ξ)
∑J
i=1 xi + (γ(ξ) + 1)
∑J
i=1 |pi(ξ)|
(γ(ξ)(|I2|+ |I3|+ 1) + |I2|+ 1) γ(ξ)
≤γ(ξ)
∑J
i=1 xi + (γ(ξ) + 1)
∑J
i=1 |pi(ξ)|
γ(ξ)
= ‖x‖1 +
(
+
1
γ(ξ)
)
‖p1(ξ)‖1 .

We end this section by establishing the convergence result of the second-stage LCP(q,M )
solutions as  ↓ 0 for any given pair (x, ξ) ∈ RJ × Ξ.
Proposition 3.4. For any fixed  > 0 and (x, ξ) ∈ RJ+ × Ξ, let z(ξ) = (y(ξ), λ(ξ)) denote
the unique solution of the regularized problem LCP(q,M ). Then
lim
↓0
‖z(ξ)− z¯(ξ)‖ = 0,
where z¯(ξ) = (y¯(ξ), λ¯(ξ)) denotes the unique least l2-norm solution of the LCP(q,M). Moreover,
the j-th component of the least l2-norm solution of problem (2.9) has one of the following three
forms: {
(0, 0),
(
−γ(ξ)T¯ − pj(ξ)
γ(ξ)
, 0
)
,
(
xj ,−γ(ξ)(T¯ + xj) + pj(ξ)
)}
(3.6)
for j ∈ J , where
T¯ := lim
↓0
T  =
J∑
i=1
y¯i.
Furthermore, for a.e. ξ ∈ Ξ there exists κ¯(ξ) > 0, such that
‖λ(ξ)− λ¯(ξ)‖ ≤ κ¯(ξ). (3.7)
The proof of Proposition 3.4 is given in Appendix.
4. Convergence analysis
In this section, we first prove the convergence of the unique solution of the regularized prob-
lem (3.2) to the solution set of the original problem as the regularized parameter  decreases
to zero. Next, we will study the sample average approximation (SAA) to solve the regularized
problem. See [7]. Combined with our regularization approaches, we demonstrate the conver-
gence property of the solution of our regularized SAA model as the number of samples goes to
infinity. More specifically, the convergence analysis in this section is divided into two parts: the
convergence analysis of the regularized problem as the regularized parameter  tends to zero,
and the analysis of regularized SAA. We finally build up the convergence relationship between
the regularized SAA approach and the original problem.
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4.1. Convergence of the regularized model
In this subsection, we only need to consider the convergence properties of the first-stage
decision vector, i.e., x ∈ RJ+ that solves problem (3.2), when the regularized parameter  tends
to zero. The convergence property of the solution (x, y, λ) then follows combining the result
of section 3. From Proposition 3.3, we know that for fixed  > 0 problem (3.2) admits a unique
first-stage solution x. In the following, we concern about the sequence of accumulation points
of {x} as  ↓ 0.
For the existence of accumulation points, we have the following result.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose there exists p0 > 0 such that for all j ∈ J , pj(ξ) ≤a.s. p0. Then,
with  ↓ 0, {x} is bounded.
Proof. From the condition on pj(ξ), there must a sufficiently large α > 0 such that for any
j ∈ J
γ0α− pj(ξ) > 0, for a.e. ξ ∈ Ξ.
Then we have
−γ(ξ)(T
 + α)− pj(ξ)
γ(ξ) + 1
< 0, for a.e. ξ ∈ Ξ.
Assume that {x} is unbounded for the purpose of arriving at a contradiction. Then, it follows
that there exist some indices j ∈ J , such that (x)j ≥ α. Then we consider the j-th component
of the first-stage complementarity relation,
0 ≤ (x)j⊥cj(x)j − E
[(
λ(ξ)
)
j
]
+ aj ≥ 0,
which can be expressed, from (3.4), as
0 ≤ (x)j⊥cj(x)j + aj ≥ 0.
However, this complementarity relation cannot be obtained because (x)j > 0 and cj(x
)j+aj >
0. This completes our proof. 
Note that the conditions pj(ξ) ≤a.s. p0 can be easily satisfied in many practical applications.
For example, with given data sets of p(ξ) we can always find an upper bound p0 := maxj{pj(ξ)}.
Lemma 4.1. Suppose there exists a constant p0 > 0 such that for all j ∈ J , pj(ξ) ≤a.s. p0.
Then, there exists a sequence {k}∞k=1 with k ↓ 0 as k →∞ such that xk → xˆ and λk → λˆ,
lim
k→∞
E[λk(ξ)] = E[λ¯(ξ)],
where xk and λk(ξ) are parts of the unique solution of problem (3.2) with  = k, and λ¯(ξ) is
part of the least norm solution of the second-stage problem (3.2) with x = xˆ.
Proof. From Proposition 4.1, there exists a sequence {xk} such that limk→∞ xk = xˆ. From
(3.7), we have ∥∥∥E[λˆ(ξ)]− E[λ¯(ξ)]∥∥∥
≤ ∥∥E[λk(ξ)]− E[λ¯(ξ)]∥∥+ ∥∥∥E[λˆ(ξ)]− E[λk(ξ)]∥∥∥
≤ E[κ¯(ξ)]k +
∥∥∥E[λˆ(ξ)]− E[λk(ξ)]∥∥∥ .
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From Lemma 3.1 and (3.7), for a.e. ξ ∈ Ξ∥∥∥λk(ξ)− λˆ(ξ)∥∥∥→ 0 as k →∞.
We have from the derivation that the estimation∥∥∥λk(ξ)− λˆ(ξ)∥∥∥ ≤ ∥∥λk(ξ)∥∥+ ∥∥∥λˆ(ξ)∥∥∥
≤ 4
√
J
(
γ(ξ) ‖w‖1 + ‖p(ξ)‖1
)
, for a.e. ξ ∈ Ξ,
where the last term comes from Lemma 3.1 with some vector w with {xk}∞k=1, xˆ ⊂ [0, w]. It
follows from the Lebesgue Dominated Convergence Theorem, we have∥∥E[λk(ξ)]− E[λ¯(ξ)]∥∥→ 0 as k →∞.
Then we complete the proof. 
Theorem 4.1. Any accumulation point of {x, y, λ} as  ↓ 0 is a solution of problem (2.9).
Proof. We only need to verify that for any k ↓ 0, the accumulation point xˆ of subsequence
{xk} is a first-stage solution of (2.9). Since xk is the first-stage solution of problem (3.2) for
any k > 0, we have with x
k = xk
0 ≤ xk⊥Cxk − E[λk(ξ)] + a ≥ 0,
which, by using the ‘min’ NCP function (see, for example, [32]), can be rewritten as
min{xk, Cxk − E[λk(ξ)] + a} = 0.
By Lemma 4.1, we have
0 = lim
k→∞
min{xk, Cxk − E[λk(ξ)]+ a} = min{xˆ, Cxˆ− E[λ¯(ξ)] + a}
as k →∞. Thus we obtain that
min{xˆ, Cxˆ− E[λ¯(ξ)] + a} = 0.
The statement then follows from Proposition 3.4. 
4.2. Convergence of the regularized SAA model
In this subsection, we study the SAA scheme for solving the regularized problem (3.2) and
focus on the convergence of the regularized SAA approach. More specifically, we focus on the
SAA convergence analysis and the solution of the first-stage problem. It is noteworthy that
Chen, Sun and Xu considered a discrete approximation scheme in [9], which also leads to an
approximation of the response variable in the second-stage problem.
Let ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξν denote ν independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) samples. Then, with
slight abuse of notation, we can obtain the following formulation of problem (3.2) with SAA:
0 ≤ x⊥Cx− 1
ν
ν∑
`=1
λ(ξ`) + a ≥ 0,
0 ≤
(
y(ξ`)
λ(ξ`)
)
⊥
(
Π(ξ`) I
−I I
)(
y(ξ`)
λ(ξ`)
)
+
( −p(ξ`)
x
)
≥ 0, ` = 1, . . . , ν.
(4.1)
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Or, we can write the problem collectively for all ν samples
0 ≤

x
v1
...
vν
⊥

C 1νB . . .
1
νB
−BT D1
...
. . .
−BT Dν


x
v1
...
vν
+

a
q1
...
qν
 ≥ 0, (4.2)
where C ∈ RJ×J , B = ( 0 −I ) ∈ RJ×2J , and for ` = 1, . . . , ν, D` = ( Π(ξ`) I−I I
)
∈
R2J×2J , v` = (y(ξ`), λ(ξ`))T , q` = (−p(ξ`), 0)T . Thus, (4.2) is treated as a large-scale determin-
istic linear complementarity problem:
0 ≤ z⊥Hz + q¯ ≥ 0, (4.3)
where z = (x, v1, ..., vν)
T , q¯ = (a, q1, · · · , qν)T , and H denotes the coefficient matrix in (4.2).
We have the following assertion of existence and uniqueness of problem (4.1) by [32, Theorem
3.1.6].
Proposition 4.2. For any fixed  > 0 and positive integer ν, there exists a unique solution of
problem (4.1).
Recall the result of Lemma 3.1 and the following proposition can be shown in a similar way
as in [7, Proposition 3.7].
Proposition 4.3. Let (y(ξ), λ(ξ)) be the unique solution of the regularized second-stage prob-
lem (3.2) for any (x, ξ) ∈ RJ+ × Ξ. Then,
1
ν
ν∑
`=1
λ(ξ`)→ E[λ(ξ)]
with probability (w.p.) 1 as ν →∞ uniformly on B(x, δ) ∩ RJ+ for any δ > 0,
Let xν denote the first J-components of the unique solution of problem of (4.1), and we
have the following assertion.
Lemma 4.2. Suppose there exists p0 > 0 such that for all j ∈ J , pj(ξ) ≤a.s. p0. Then, with
 ↓ 0, {xν} is bounded.
We omit the proof since it can be shown analogously as in Proposition 4.1.
Theorem 4.2. Suppose there exists p0 > 0 such that for all j ∈ J , pj(ξ) ≤a.s. p0. Then, for
any fixed  > 0, xν → x w.p. 1 as ν →∞.
Proof. From Propositions 3.3, Proposition 4.2, and Lemma 4.2, for any fixed  > 0, both the
regularized problem (3.2) and its SAA-regularized problem (4.1) have solutions and contained
in some compact subset in RJ+. We know from Proposition 4.3 that
1
ν
ν∑
`=1
λ(ξ`)→ E[λ(ξ)]
as ν →∞, uniformly with respect to x on any compact set. Then, we have xν → x w.p. 1 as
ν →∞ by [44, Proposition 19]. 
Combining Theorem 4.1 with Theorem 4.2, we have the following convergence result.
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Theorem 4.3. Suppose there exists p0 > 0 such that for all j ∈ J , pj(ξ) ≤a.s. p0. Then,
lim sup
↓0
lim
ν→∞x

ν ⊆ S∗
w.p. 1, where S∗ denotes the optimal solution set of the first-stage problem of (2.9).
5. Numerical tests and applications on crude oil market
In this section, we firstly carry out numerical experiments using randomly generated data
to illustrate the effectiveness of our model and its solution approach. Furthermore, we adopt
our two-stage stochastic CN equilibrium problem to describe market share competition in crude
oil market. The results show that the model is capable of reproducing the actual oil market
share based on in-sample data. Moreover, it is also shown that the model can make good
out-of-sample predictions using historical data. All the tests are run in MATLAB 2016b on a
personal computer with 32GB RAM and 8-core processor (3.6× 8GHz).
5.1. Progressive hedging method and smoothing Newton sub-algorithm
Firstly, randomly generated problems are used for testing our regularized SAA approach to
solve the two-stage stochastic CN equilibrium problem. Recall that the model of interests takes
the form of a scenario-based linear complementarity problem (4.1) or its equivalent expression
(4.2) with sufficiently small . The solution process adopts the well-known PHM. The PHM is
globally convergent and the convergence rate is linear for problem (4.2) with SAA approach.
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The classical PHM to solve (4.2) is as follows
Algorithm 1: Progressive hedging method
Step 0. Given an initial point x0 ∈ RJ , let x0` = x0 ∈ RJ , v0` ∈ R2J and w0` ∈ RJ , for
` = 1, . . . , ν, such that 1νΣ
ν
`=1w
0
` = 0. Set the initial point z
0 = (x0, v01 , . . . , v
0
ν)
T . Choose a step
size r > 0. Set k = 0.
Step 1. If the point zk satisfies the condition
‖min(zk, Hzk + q¯)‖ ≤ 10−6,
output the solution zk and terminate the algorithm; otherwise, go to Step 2.
Step 2. For ` = 1, . . . , ν, find (xˆk` , vˆ
k
` ) that solves linear complementarity problems
0 ≤ x`⊥Cx` +Bv` + a+ wk` + r(x` − xk` ) ≥ 0,
0 ≤ v`⊥−BTx` +D`v` + q` + r(v` − vk` ) ≥ 0.
(5.1)
Then let x¯k+1 = 1ν
∑ν
`=1 xˆ
k
` , and for ` = 1, . . . , ν, update
xk+1` = x¯
k+1, vk+1` = vˆ
k
` , w
k+1
` = w
k
` + r(xˆ
k
` − xk+1` ),
to get point zk+1 = (x¯k+1, vk+11 , . . . , v
k+1
ν )
T .
Step 3. Set k := k + 1; go back to Step 1.
The PHM involves solving ν independently sample-based LCP (5.1) at each iteration. Prob-
lem (5.1) is well-defined, since for ` = 1, . . . , ν, the coefficient matrix(
C + rI B
−BT D` + rI
)
∈ R3J×3J
is positive definite for any  > 0. Thus, it has a unique solution for each ` = 1, . . . , ν. For
simplicity, denote (5.1) as
0 ≤ z`⊥H˜`z` + q˜` ≥ 0, (5.2)
where z` =
(
x`
v`
)
, H˜` =
(
C + rI B
−BT D` + rI
)
, q˜` =
(
a+ wk` − rxk`
q` − rvk`
)
with ` = 1, 2, . . . , ν.
Then, we can equivalently write a large-scale LCP for all ν samples and solve
0 ≤

z1
z2
...
zν
⊥

H˜1
H˜2
. . .
H˜ν


z1
z2
...
zν
+

q˜1
q˜2
...
q˜ν
 ≥ 0. (5.3)
The structure of problem (5.3) enables us to use block computation to solve it, which can
significantly improves the efficiency of the PHM. For example, suppose ν = mN with m,N
being positive integer number. The equivalent m-block reformulation for (5.3) reads
0 ≤

zi1
zi2
...
zim
⊥

H˜i1
H˜i2
. . .
H˜im


zi1
zi2
...
zim
+

q˜i1
q˜i2
...
q˜im
 ≥ 0, (5.4)
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where ij = iN + j, j = 1, . . . ,m, i = 0, . . . , (m− 1)N .
The main computation cost of the PHM is in Step 2 due to the large sample size ν despite
the relative low cost in solving for one sample. Block implementation speeds up the computation
by better exploring and rebalancing the computational load. In practice, the number of blocks
are adjusted so that the over all computation time is minimized. To improve the efficiency of
the PHM, we also use the warm-start technique suggested in [33] to choose an initial point for
subproblem (5.1). More specifically, the solution zk of subproblem (5.1) at the k-th iteration is
used as a starting point for the (k + 1)-th iteration.
In the remaining of this subsection, we focus on problem (5.2) for a given sample and omit
the subscription ` for ease of expression. In order to take advantage of the sparse structure of
the subproblem (5.2), we apply the smoothing Newton method proposed by Chen and Ye [12]
to solve it. In what follows, we give a brief description of the smoothing Newton method. It is
well-known that solving (5.2) for a given sample is equivalent to solving the nonsmooth equation
F (z) = min(z, H˜z + q˜) = 0. (5.5)
The main idea of the smoothing Newton method is to use a smooth approximation function to
approximate the nonsmooth function F and then solve the corresponding linear system. We
use the smooth Gariel-More´ approximation function f : R3J ×R++ → R3J to approximate the
nonsmooth function F . The density function is ρ(s) = 2/(s2 + 4)
3
2 (see [12] for details). In our
numerical tests, the j-th component of f reads
fj(z, δ) = (z)j − 1
2
(√
(H˜z + q˜ − z)2j + 4δ2 + (z − H˜z − q˜)j
)
, j = 1, . . . , 3J,
where the corresponding j-th diagonal element of the Jacobian D¯(z) is
D¯jj(z) =
1
2
 (z − H˜z − q˜)j√
(z − H˜z − q˜)2j + 4δ2
+ 1
 , j = 1, . . . , 3J.
Then, the smoothing Newton method for solving subproblem (5.5) requires to solve a linear
equation to determine dk at each iteration, namely
∇zf(zk, δk)dk + F (zk) = 0, (5.6)
where∇zf(zk, δk) = I−D¯(zk)(I−H˜), δk decreases to 0 according to the criterion in article [12].
To guarantee the well-defineness of (5.6), we make use of the following result.
Theorem 5.1. [15] For any diagonal matrix D˜ = diag(D˜jj) ∈ RJ×J with 0 ≤ D˜jj ≤ 1, j =
1, 2, . . . , J , the matrix I − D˜(I −A) is nonsingular if and only if A is a P-matrix. 
For any given sample, it is known that H is positive definite and hence a P-matrix. Moreover,
D¯(z) is a diagonal matrix with its element on the interval [0, 1] for any (z, δ) ∈ R3J × R++.
Therefore, using Theorem 5.1, the Jacobian ∇zf(z, δ) is nonsingular for any (z, δ) ∈ R3J×R++.
Thus, the linear equation (5.6) is well-defined.
Denoting the matrix D¯(z) = diag(D¯1(z), D¯2(z), D¯3(z)), the Jacobian ∇zf(z, δ) at the point
z is of the following structure
∇zf(z, δ) = (I − D¯(z)) + D¯(z)H˜)
,
 Λ1(z) 0 −D¯1(z)0 u1(z)eT + Λ2(z) D¯2(z)
D¯3(z) −D¯3(z) Λ3(z)
 , (5.7)
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where Λ1(z) = D¯1(z)(C + (r − 1)I) + I, Λ2(z) = (γ(ξ) + (r − 1))D¯2(z) + I, Λ3(z) = (+ (r −
1))D¯3(z) + I are all diagonal matrices, and u1(z) = γ(ξ)D¯2(z)e. We can take advantage of
the sparse structure of (5.7) in solving (5.6). Specifically, ∇zf(z, δ) consists of only diagonal
sub-matrix and the matrix u1(z)e
T + Λ2(z), where the later is a sum of a diagonal sub-matrix
and a rank-one matrix.
Noticing from (5.7), linear equation (5.6) is of the following form Λ1 0 Λ20 u1uT2 + Λ3 Λ4
Λ5 Λ6 Λ7
 s1s2
s3
 =
 b1b2
b3
 , (5.8)
where Λi ∈ RJ , i = 1, 2, . . . , 7 are diagonal matrices with Λ1 and Λ3 being nonsingular, si ∈
RJ , bi ∈ RJ , i = 1, 2, 3, and u1, u2 ∈ RJ . For ease of notation, we use Λˆ = diag(1/Λ11, . . . , 1/ΛJJ)
to represent the inverse of any invertible diagonal matrix Λ = diag(Λ11, . . . ,ΛJJ). Given the
sparse structure of the coefficient matrix, we can solve (5.8) efficiently. More exactly, by the
first two equations of (5.8), we can get
s1 = Λˆ1(b1 − Λ2s3), (5.9)
s2 = (u1u
T
2 + Λ3)
−1(b2 − Λ4s3). (5.10)
Directly substituting (5.9) and (5.10) into the third equation of (5.8), then we have
(Λ7 − Λ5Λˆ1Λ2 − Λ6(u1uT2 + Λ3)−1Λ4)s3 = b3 + const, (5.11)
where const = −(Λ5Λˆ1b1 + Λ6(u1uT2 + Λ3)−1b2). For computing the inverse matrix of (u1uT2 +
Λ3), the Sherman-Morrison formula is useful. We have by the Sherman-Morrison formula
(u1u
T
2 + Λ3)
−1 = Λˆ3 − Λˆ3u1u
T
2 Λˆ3
1 + uT2 Λˆ3u1
. (5.12)
Substituting (5.12) into (5.11), we get
(Λ0 + αu˜1u˜
T
2 )s3 = b3 + const,
where α = 1/(1 + uT2 Λˆ3u1),Λ0 = Λ7 − Λ5Λˆ1Λ2 − Λ6Λˆ3Λ4, u˜1 = Λ6Λˆ3u1, u˜2 = Λ4Λˆ3u2. Then,
if Λ0 is nonsingular, using the Sherman-Morrison formula again, we can immediately get the
solution of s3
s3 =
(
Λˆ0 − αΛˆ0u˜1u˜
T
2 Λˆ0
1 + αu˜T2 Λˆ0u˜1
)
(b3 + const). (5.13)
Then, substituting the s3 into (5.9) and (5.10), we get the solution of s1 and s2, respectively.
From (5.13), one can know that the computation cost of s3 is trivial, since we only need to
compute inverse of several diagonal matrix, namely, Λ0,Λ1, and Λ3. Once s3 is obtained, the
calculation of s1 and s2 just needs to perform matrix-vector production. Therefore, the linear
equation (5.8) can be solve efficiently.
5.2. Randomly generated problems
For the first part of numerical test, we randomly generated the problem of the form (4.2).
More specifically, we generate a set of i.i.d. samples {ξ`}ν`=1 from a uniformly distribution over
the interval [0, 1]. For ` = 1, . . . , ν, set
p(ξ`) = ((ξ`)1, (ξ`)2, . . . , (ξ`)J)
T , Π(ξ`) = γ(ξ`)(ee
T + I) , (ξ`)1(eeT + I).
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Diagonal matrix C ∈ RJ×J and a ∈ RJ are generated with its elements uniformly distributed
over the interval [1, 2]. All the numerical results are based on the average of 10 independent
runs.
To show the feasibility of the solution of the regularized problem compared to that of the
original problem, we compute the following residual value
Res = ‖min(z,Hz + q¯)‖,
where H denotes the coefficient matrix of (4.2) with  = 0.
Selected numerical results for J = 10 were listed in the Table 5.1 and 5.2. The first table
is the solution obtained by PHM without block computation, while table 5.2 illustrates results
with block implementation. For our generated experiments, we found N = 50 is the best block
choice (measured by CPU time) for J = 10. The average number of iterations, the average cpu
time, and the average value of Res were recorded in both table. It is easy to see that the block
implementation greatly reduces the cpu time. For the same value of , the number of iterations
increases slightly when the sample size ν increases. In cases where the sample size ν is kept
constant and the values of regularization parameter  are chosen from  = 10−3 to  = 10−12,
the iteration numbers are barely influenced as well as the cpu time. Furthermore, we observe
the convergence of our regularization approach with decreasing values of , as have been proved
in previous sections. Also notice that, the value of Res decreases when the  diminishes from
10−3 to 10−12. Numerically, it shows that the solution of the regularized problem is also that
of the original problem when  = 10−12.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the performance of the PHM measured by the number of iterations
and cpu time for 10 players. It is also worth mentioning that although one might expect the
problem to be more difficult to solve for a small , the numerical performance in our experiments
remain roughly unaffected with decreasing values of .
Figure 5.2 demonstrates the convergence property of the first-stage solution x when the
sample size gets large for the case J = 10. The convergence trend can be seen component-
wisely as the solution x converges when the sample size ν gets large.
ν J(1 + 2ν) Iter CPU time/s Res Iter CPU time/s Res
 = 10−3  = 10−6
10 210 146.30 0.26 4.42e-01 176.20 0.32 3.88e-04
50 1010 194.70 1.81 9.35e-01 197.40 1.83 9.32e-04
500 10010 208.70 26.72 3.00e+00 212.20 27.21 2.99e-03
2000 40010 222.60 154.97 5.93e+00 220.50 153.54 6.00e-03
5000 100010 224.70 623.53 9.49e+00 226.40 627.53 9.48e-03
 = 10−9  = 10−12
10 210 152.70 0.27 1.08e-06 169.40 0.30 9.49e-07
50 1010 197.20 1.83 1.41e-06 194.40 1.80 9.75e-07
500 10010 212.70 27.21 3.21e-06 209.70 26.85 9.59e-07
2000 40010 220.30 153.34 6.16e-06 220.70 153.73 9.51e-07
5000 100010 226.70 628.89 9.60e-06 226.20 627.58 9.60e-07
Table 5.1: Numerical results for different  and sample size ν, J = 10 with individual sample.
5.3. Crude oil market
In this subsection, we demonstrate one application of our two-stage stochastic Nash equi-
librium model in describing the crude oil market share. Namely, we investigate the strategies
of crude oil exporting agents via solutions of our reformulated SVI problem so as to recreate
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ν J(1 + 2ν) Iter CPU time/s Res Iter CPU time/s Res
 = 10−3  = 10−6
10 210 162.60 0.21 4.04e-01 155.50 0.20 4.14e-04
50 1010 180.60 0.94 9.42e-01 184.00 0.93 9.31e-04
500 10010 203.30 10.67 2.97e+00 204.10 10.61 2.98e-03
2000 40010 213.80 42.38 5.89e+00 213.70 42.36 5.91e-03
5000 100010 218.20 115.15 9.36e+00 219.60 115.63 9.36e-03
 = 10−9  = 10−12
10 210 143.20 0.19 1.08e-06 149.50 0.19 9.59e-07
50 1010 197.40 1.02 1.38e-06 191.10 0.97 9.58e-07
500 10010 205.10 10.58 3.19e-06 202.40 10.67 9.52e-07
2000 40010 214.10 42.46 6.07e-06 213.40 42.62 9.73e-07
5000 100010 219.00 115.35 9.50e-06 219.70 115.58 9.74e-07
Table 5.2: Numerical results for different  and sample size ν, J = 10 with block implementation.
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Fig. 5.1. Numerical comparisons among different , J = 10.
actual market shares. Based on historical data on crude oil market, we make in-sample back-
tracking test to establish the effectiveness and validity of our model while explaining the market
behaviour. Furthermore, the out-of-sample prediction capability of our model is demonstrated
when training data is used to specify model parameters. From the results of our numerical
tests, we conclude that our model is suitable to reproduce, predict and potentially capable to
explain stable market shares of crude oil.
Crude oil market is one of the most widely studied commodity market in the world. The
market has long been described as of an ‘intermediate between monopoly and perfect compe-
tition [22]”, supported by extensive historical data and market observation. When the market
encounters large sudden events, it took “oil shocks” [17, 18, 25]. Conceptually, consequences of
supply and demand fluctuation, along with many other factors, are reflected most directly in
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Fig. 5.2. Convergence property of x with increasing ν, J = 10.
dramatic changes in oil price. One interesting observation is that the market share behaves
rather smoothly even during periods of oil shocks [25]. Majority of the world’s crude oil is sup-
plied by a few large oil exporting countries and they are viewed collectively as a finite number
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Fig. 5.3. Market shares of different oil-producing countries, 1965-2017.
of large agents from which price-taking consumers purchase product at the same price [45].
Hence, it is no surprise that CN approaches have been adopted from earlier days of study in
this field, see [42]. The study of oil shock gives rise to rich field of economic researches in oil
market structure and as well as factors affecting oil price, see [1, 26, 49], etc. Our model does
not attempt to make explanation or future predictions on oil shocks but rather aims to make
sense of the stable characteristics of supply-side of oil market share: major agents acting non-
cooperatively to achieve market equilibrium. We focus on the supply factor of oil, while treat
other factors, e.g., demand, world economic situation, population, etc., as known information
with uncertainty. Our model is found to be able to reproduce the market shares as well as to
forecast future production plans of different oil-producing countries based on historical data.
In short, we firstly use historical data to determine model parameters as well as to approximate
distribution for uncertainty in observations of the market. Model parameters are tested within
a fixed sampling window so that the in-sample results obtained by solving our model matches
that of training data set. It then follows that over a short decision horizon in the future, we can
adopt the trained model to prediction future production plans. More specifically, we took i.i.d.
samples using a fixed-size rolling window sampling method while the prediction is obtained by
solving our model with the adjusted set of parameters obtained by in-sample tests within the
training window.
5.3.1. Data set, parameter selection and uncertainty description
In order to implement real market data into our model (2.6)-(2.7), we need to determine param-
eters cj , aj correspond to production costs of j-th agent by analyzing training set. In practice,
model parameters are adjusted via a brute force learning process. More specifically, if the
training set consists only one trading day of information, we adjust the parameters so that the
solution, i.e., production quantities of J agents, matches the estimated historical observation.
When more data become available, the parameters are adjusted so that the average of solutions
is close to the real estimate. It is found from our numerical implementation that the best fit
solutions are obtained when values of cj and aj are taken to be inversely proportional to known
market share within the sampling period. It is firstly learned that the common belief of “lower
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unit cost would lead to large sale” does not hold in our model, which also motivates the choice
of quadratic production cost in our model. Moreover, it is found in our numerical experiment
that the smaller the quadratic cost parameters cj the greater market share the agent would
have. This can be understood from the fact that the large oil producing agents are more flexible
in adjusting their production quantities as compare to smaller agents. A more mathematical in-
terpretation is to think of cj as related to the penalty parameters of the augmented Lagrangian
formulation corresponding to production constraints of each agent: production cost is upper
bounded with some unit production cost a˜j . In this way, one can think of this observation
been that the countries has greater reserve of oil suffers less when the production upper bound
gets violated. Nevertheless, we found that the quadratic is more than adequate to reproduce
historical observations.
The scenarios of stochastic parameters are taken from empirical distribution of the sampling
data set, guided by the analysis of [19]. In detail, we draw samples to generate scenarios of
market’s supply discounting factor γ(ξ) and j-th agent’s adjusted price pj(ξ) = p0(ξ) − hj(ξ).
The data set used in this study are from (i)Statistical Review of World Energy1) , yearly data
from 1984, published every June by bp. Inc; (ii) Oil Price Dynamics Report2) , weekly by
Federal Reserve Bank of New York since 1986; (iii)U.S. Energy Information Administration3) ,
weekly and daily spot price of Brent. The empirical distribution are generated from the contents
of oil dynamic report, consists of time series of weekly percentage change of Brent spot price
and its corresponding components’ contributions, i.e., those from demand, residual, and supply.
More specifically, the percentage change in price in (k + 1)-th4) week compared to that of the
k-th week is denoted by 4pk, while the contribution of demand and supply changes are denoted
as 4Dk and 4Sk respectively. The contribution to the price change that does not correspond
to demand and supply is denoted as residual 4Rk. Therefore, for any week within the report,
it holds that the Brent price change is determinately represented by
4pk = 4Dk +4T k +4Rk. (5.14)
Recall that our expression for (scenario-based) inverse demand function of quantity offered to
the market for a given scenario ξ` is in the following form
pk(ξ`)− γk(ξ`)T k(yξ`).
In accordance with data structure, pk(ξ`) corresponds to the adjusted predicted price from
contributions other than supply, i.e.,
pk(ξ`) = p
k
0
(
1 +4dk(ξ`) +4rk(ξ`)
)
,
where pk0 denotes the known Brent spot price prior to that of the concerned time. Both 4dk(ξ`)
and 4rk(ξ`) are random scenarios taken from empirical distributions of historical demand and
residual distributions within the sampling set respectively. To estimate γk(ξ), corresponding
to k-week data, we need the data of spot quantity supplied to the market, T k. In practice,
it is very difficult to obtain reliable data on total supply to the market over short observation
window. Rather, we observe that trust-worthy estimate on daily oil supply based on annual
1) https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html
2) https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/policy/oil price dynamics report
3) https://www.eia.gov
4) k is used to denote the order in time, distinguished from that of i.i.d. samples
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data is available along with the observation that a steady growth of about 1% per year over the
last four decades, according to Statistical Review of World Energy. Therefore, we take random
instances of daily market supply T k(yξ) which are taken from a uniformly distributed interval
between 99% and 101% of yearly based daily estimate. Then, we can generate a set of data of
stochastic excessive supply discount factor {γk(ξ`)},
γk(ξ`) =
|pk(ξ`)− pk0 |
T k(yξ)
,
where pk0 is known with certainty within the testing data set, and the | · | ensures that increase
in quantity has a negative influence on price.
We present the results for our numerical experiments on reproduced oil market share. As
shown in Fig 5.4, the in-sample results over the periods of oil shocks 2007, 2009 and 2014 are
reproduced using solely from the available information within that year. For example, the in-
sample experiment of 2009 uses all the available data obtained within 2009, e.g., daily price from
01/01/2009 to 31/12/2009. For the generation of random instances in-sample, we use weekly
price contribution covering the year 2009 to form empirical distributions for supply excluded
spot prices p(ξk), and discounting factor γ(ξk), from which we took i.i.d. samples to represent
random scenarios. Hence, for in-sample experiments, our goal is to reproduce known market
share with the adjustments of cost parameters aj , cj corresponding to j-th oil producing agent.
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Fig. 5.4. Real, in-sample and out-of-sample market shares results, 2008-2017.
The out-of-sample tests cover the period from 2007 to 2017 with the one year length equiv-
alent of sampling window in Figure 5.4. Note that one year sampling window is adopted since
independent numerical results of selected years demonstrated that the market has a short mem-
ory in the sense that longer historical data would not provide extra information, at least in the
setup of our model and approaches. Prior to the date of interests, all the historical data are
assumed to be available while the rolling window sampling permits the usage of newly acquired
data as soon as it becomes available. From the construction and interpretation of our two-stage
model, it is reasonable to assume that cost of oil production remain unchanged over a short
decision horizon. Furthermore, we tested different lengths of the sampling window, especially
during times of oil shocks for better in-sample fitting, and the best fit sampling window length
is used in out-of-sample tests. For example, we are interested in obtaining the market share
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of 2009, during times of recent financial crisis, using the fixed length sampling windows whose
length varies from one year to five years. If we want to predict the production on 01/01/2009
using a sampling window of one year, we took one year sampling window from 01/01/2008 to
31/01/2008 to obtain empirical distributions from which scenarios of γ(ξk), p(ξk) are sampled.
Taking ν samples, the solutions method follows that described in previous subsection. For the
result on 02/01/2019, the sampling window rolls forward using the data form 02/01/2008 to
01/01/2009 since the last day information becomes known, while the model remains unchanged.
Therefore, for the market share prediction of any given year, we obtained the daily results by
taking average of 250 samples, while the yearly estimate is formed by taking the average on
daily results. From Figure 5.4, it is observed that we can obtain fair good prediction quantities
through out the testing period. However, it is worth mentioning that during the numerical
experiments across that decision horizon the computational cost is much higher during periods
over oil shocks compare to those of relative stable oil prices.
6. Conclusion
A two-stage SVI is used to describe the equilibrium of a convex two-stage non-cooperative
multi-agent game under uncertainty. Sufficient conditions for the existence of solutions of the
two-stage SVI are provided. The numerical implementation is constructed by proposing a reg-
ularized SAA method. Furthermore, we prove the convergence of the regularized SAA method
as the regularization parameter tends to zero and the sample size tends to infinity. A real ap-
plication of crude oil market equilibrium is studied using our approach. More specifically, the
oligopolistic market is characterized by a two-stage stochastic production and supply planning
game and the market share is achieved at the equilibrium. Numerical results are presented
based on historical data over the last fifty years and the effectiveness of our two-stage SVI
approach of market share is demonstrated.
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A. Appendix
Proof of Theorem 3.1.
Proof. By direct computation, we have that(
M (ξ)
(
y
λ
)
+ q(x, ξ)
)
j
=
{
γ(ξ)(y)j + γ(ξ)T
 + (λ)j − pj(ξ), j = 1, . . . , J ;
xj−J − (y)j−J + (λ)j−J , j = J + 1, . . . , 2J.
Then, we can rewrite problem (3.2) as below:{
0 ≤ (y)j⊥γ(ξ)(y)j + γ(ξ)T  + (λ)j − pj(ξ) ≥ 0,
0 ≤ (λ)j⊥xj − (y)j + (λ)j ≥ 0,
(A.1)
for j ∈ J . From the first complementarity condition in (A.1), we have (y)j as follows:
(y)j =
−
γ(ξ)T  + (λ)j − pj(ξ)
γ(ξ)
, γ(ξ)T  + (λ)j − pj(ξ) < 0;
0, γ(ξ)T  + (λ)j − pj(ξ) ≥ 0
(A.2)
for j ∈ J . Similarly, we can derive that
(λ)j =

(y)j − xj

, (y)j − xj > 0;
0, (y)j − xj ≤ 0
(A.3)
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for j ∈ J . Note that (y)j = 0 implies (y)j = 0 ≤ xj , and we have (λ)j = 0. Then, based on
(A.2) and (A.3), we have for all three cases:
(y)j = 0, (λ
)j = 0 for j ∈ I1;
(y)j = −γ(ξ)T
 + (λ)j − pj(ξ)
γ(ξ)
, (λ)j = 0 for j ∈ I2;
(y)j = −γ(ξ)T
 + (λ)j − pj(ξ)
γ(ξ)
, (λ)j =
(y)j − xj

for j ∈ I3,
where
I1 := {j ∈ J : γ(ξ)T  + (λ)j − pj(ξ) ≥ 0, (y)j − xj ≤ 0} ,
I2 := {j ∈ J : γ(ξ)T  + (λ)j − pj(ξ) < 0, (y)j − xj ≤ 0} ,
I3 := {j ∈ J : γ(ξ)T  + (λ)j − pj(ξ) < 0, (y)j − xj > 0} .
It follows that,
((y)j , (λ
)j) =

(0, 0), j ∈ I1;(
−γ(ξ)T
 − pj(ξ)
γ(ξ)
, 0
)
, j ∈ I2;(
−γ(ξ)T
 − xj − pj(ξ)
γ(ξ) + 1
,−γ(ξ)(T
 + xj)− pj(ξ)
γ(ξ) + 1
)
, j ∈ I3,
which verifies (3.4). For the remaining of the proof, let j ∈ I2, we have
−γ(ξ)(y)j = γ(ξ)T  − pj(ξ)
and thus
−γ(ξ)
∑
i∈I2
(y)i = |I2|γ(ξ)T  −
∑
i∈I2
pi(ξ). (A.4)
Analogously, we can derive from
(y)j = −γ(ξ)T
 + (λ)j − pj(ξ)
γ(ξ)
and (λ)j =
(y)j − xj

for j ∈ I3
that
−γ(ξ)
∑
i∈I3
(y)i = |I3|γ(ξ)T  + 1

∑
i∈I3
(y)i − 1

∑
i∈I3
xi −
∑
i∈I3
pi(ξ). (A.5)
Combining that of (A.4) and (A.5), we obtain
−γ(ξ)T  = (|I2|+ |I3|)γ(ξ)T  + 1

∑
i∈I3
(y)i − 1

∑
i∈I3
xi −
∑
i∈I2∪I3
pi(ξ).
Therefore, we have
1

∑
i∈I3
(y)i = −(|I2|+ |I3|+ 1)γ(ξ)T  + 1

∑
i∈I3
xi +
∑
i∈I2∪I3
pi(ξ). (A.6)
28 J. JIANG, Y. SHI, X. WANG AND X. CHEN
Substituting (A.6) into (A.5), we have derivation
|I3| γ(ξ)T  =−
(
γ(ξ) +
1

)∑
i∈I3
(y)i +
1

∑
i∈I3
xi +
∑
i∈I3
pi(ξ)
=− (γ(ξ) + 1)
(
−(|I2|+ |I3|+ 1)γ(ξ)T  + 1

∑
i∈I3
xi +
∑
i∈I2∪I3
p(ξ)i
)
+
1

∑
i∈I3
xi +
∑
i∈I3
pi(ξ)
= (γ(ξ) + 1) (|I2|+ |I3|+ 1)γ(ξ)T  − γ(ξ)
∑
i∈I3
xi − γ(ξ)
∑
i∈I2∪I3
pi(ξ)−
∑
i∈I2
pi(ξ).
Then, we get
(γ(ξ)(|I2|+ |I3|+ 1) + |I2|+ 1) γ(ξ)T  =γ(ξ)
∑
i∈I3
xi + γ(ξ)
∑
i∈I2∪I3
pi(ξ) +
∑
i∈I2
pi(ξ),
that is,
T  =
γ(ξ)
∑
i∈I3 xi + γ(ξ)
∑
i∈I2∪I3 pi(ξ) +
∑
i∈I2 pi(ξ)
(γ(ξ)(|I2|+ |I3|+ 1) + |I2|+ 1) γ(ξ) .
This completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 3.4.
Proof. Let zˆ = (yˆ, λˆ) be any solution of LCP(q,M) and we have the derivation:
0 ≥ (z − zˆ)T (M z + q − (Mzˆ + q))
= (z − zˆ)T (M z −Mzˆ)
= (z − zˆ)TM(z − zˆ) + (z − zˆ)T
(
0
λ
)
≥ (z − zˆ)T
(
0
λ
)
= (λ − λˆ)Tλ,
where the second inequality follows from the positive semidefiniteness of M . Then, we have
‖λ‖2 ≤ λˆTλ ≤ ‖λˆ‖‖λ‖,
which implies the boundedness of λ,
‖λ‖ ≤ ‖λˆ‖. (A.7)
It follows from (A.7) that any accumulation point of {λ} as  ↓ 0 is the least l2-norm solution.
Since M is positive semidefinite, we know from [32, Theorem 5.6.2] that there is a unique least
l2-norm solution. On the other hand, we know from Proposition 3.1, for any fixed (x, ξ), yˆ is
unique. Therefore, the limit of z exists as  ↓ 0 and converges to the least l2-norm solution of
LCP(q,M).
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Due to the existence of limit for z as  ↓ 0, (3.6) can be derived directly from (3.4). In what
follows, we focus on deriving the expression (3.7). To this end, for each j ∈ J , three cases are
discussed:
γ(ξ)T  + (λ)j − pj(ξ) ≥ 0, (y)j − xj ≤ 0, (A.8)
γ(ξ)T  + (λ)j − pj(ξ) < 0, (y)j − xj ≤ 0, (A.9)
γ(ξ)T  + (λ)i − pj(ξ) < 0, (y)j − xj > 0. (A.10)
Case 1: If there exists a sequence {k}∞k=1 converging to 0 such that (A.8) holds, we have
lim
k→∞
(
(yk)j , (λ
k)j
)
= (0, 0).
Thus,
∣∣(λk)j − λ¯j∣∣ = 0.
Case 2: If there exists a sequence {k}∞k=1 converging to 0 such that (A.9) holds, we have
an estimation
lim
k→∞
(
(yk)j , (λ
k)j
)
= lim
k→∞
(
−γ(ξ)T
k − pj(ξ)
γ(ξ)
, 0
)
=
(
−γ(ξ) limk→∞ T
k − pj(ξ)
γ(ξ)
, 0
)
=
(
−γ(ξ)T¯ − pj(ξ)
γ(ξ)
, 0
)
.
Thus,
∣∣(λk)j − λ¯j∣∣ = 0.
Case 3: If there exists a sequence {k}∞k=1 converging to 0 such that (A.10) holds, we have
lim
k→∞
(
(yk)j , (λ
k)j
)
= lim
k→∞
(
−kγ(ξ)T
k − xj − kpj(ξ)
kγ(ξ) + 1
,−γ(ξ)(T
k + xj)− pj(ξ)
kγ(ξ) + 1
)
=
(
xj ,−γ(ξ)(T¯ + xj) + pj(ξ)
)
.
Thus, we have∣∣(λk)j − λ¯j∣∣
=
∣∣(λk)j + γ(ξ)(T¯ + xj)− pj(ξ)∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣−γ(ξ)(T k + xj)− pj(ξ)kγ(ξ) + 1 + γ(ξ)(T¯ + xj)− pj(ξ)
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣−γ(ξ)(T k + xj) + pj(ξ) + γ(ξ)(T¯ + xj)− pj(ξ) + kγ(ξ)(γ(ξ)(T¯ + xj)− pj(ξ))∣∣
kγ(ξ) + 1
≤ γ(ξ)
∣∣T k − T¯ ∣∣+ ∣∣γ(ξ)(γ(ξ)(T¯ + xj)− pj(ξ))∣∣ k
kγ(ξ) + 1
.
Collectively, we know from Case 1, Case 2 and Case 3 that
(yk)j − y¯j = 0, (A.11)
(yk)j − y¯j = −(T k − T¯ ), (A.12)
(yk)j − y¯j = −γ(ξ)T
k + pj(ξ)− γ(ξ)xj
kγ(ξ) + 1
· k. (A.13)
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Furthermore, we have that T k − T¯ ≥ 0 always holds. For the purpose of arriving at a contra-
diction, we assume T k − T¯ < 0. Then (A.12) implies that
yk)j − y¯j > 0.
Moreover, (A.11) and (A.13) induce
(yk)j − y¯j = 0,
(yk)j − y¯j ≥ xj − y¯j ≥ 0,
respectively. Clearly, we have T k − T¯ ≥ 0, which contradicts our assumption. In addition, we
have
T k − T¯ ≤ −γ(ξ)T
k + ‖p(ξ)‖1 + γ(ξ) ‖x‖1
kγ(ξ) + 1
· k ≤ (‖p(ξ)‖1 + γ(ξ) ‖x‖1) k.
Then, it follows that∣∣(λk)j − λ¯j∣∣
≤ γ(ξ)
∣∣T k − T¯ ∣∣+ ∣∣γ(ξ)(γ(ξ)(T¯ + xj)− pj(ξ))∣∣ k
kγ(ξ) + 1
≤ γ(ξ) (‖p(ξ)‖1 + γ(ξ) ‖x‖1) +
∣∣γ(ξ)(γ(ξ)(T¯ + xj)− pj(ξ))∣∣
kγ(ξ) + 1
· k
≤
(
γ(ξ) (‖p(ξ)‖1 + γ(ξ) ‖x‖1) + γ(ξ)2
(
‖x‖1 +
‖p(ξ)‖1
γ(ξ)
+ ‖x‖1
)
+ γ(ξ) ‖p(ξ)‖1
)
k
≤ 3 (γ(ξ)2 ‖x‖1 + γ(ξ) ‖p(ξ)‖1) k,
where the third inequality follows Lemma 3.2 and the continuity of T  that
T¯ ≤ ‖x‖1 +
‖p(ξ)‖1
γ(ξ)
.
To summarize, for each j ∈ J , we always have∣∣(λ)j − λ¯j∣∣ ≤ 3 (γ(ξ)2 ‖x‖1 + γ(ξ) ‖p(ξ)‖1) .
Then, according to the definition of l2-norm, for any given x ∈ RJ+ one can compute
κ¯(ξ) := 3
√
J
(
γ(ξ)2 ‖x‖1 + γ(ξ) ‖p(ξ)‖1
)
.

